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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATlE OF UTAH

LYNNO MATT HARRY,

:

Appellant,
v-s.

:
case No. 19745

:

FRED SCHWENDIMAN, Director
of Driver's License, State
of Utah,
Respondent.

:

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
In

this

case

appellant

seeks

to have

§41-2-19.6

U.C.A. (1953 as amended) declared unconstitutional on its face
and as applied; to find that the decision of the department of
public

safety

Suspending

his driver's license for being in

actual physical control of a motor vehicle while driving under
the influence of alcohol, was arbitrary arid capricious; and to
hold that an aQquittal of the criminal charges against him,
bars suspension of his driving privileges by the department of
public safety.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The district court denied
Reinstatement

of Driver's

License

appellant's Petition for
aftey

Public Safety had suspended his license.

the Department of

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the trial court's decision
reversed and for an order reinstating his driving privileges.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant was arrested September 8, 1983, and charged
with being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while
under

the

influence of

alcohol.

taken and he was issued
days.

His driver's

a temporary

license was

license, good

for 30

(DUI citation R. 12)
He timely requested a hearing before the Department

of

Public

Safety,

Office

of

Driver

License

(hereinafter referred to as "the department").
McRae & DeLand, R. 12)

Services

(Letter from

He was notified of the hearing to be

held September 28, 1983, by notice dated and mailed September
23, 1983.

(Letter from Office of Driver License Service dated

September 23, 1983, R. 12)

Appellant and counsel appeared at

the time and place set for hearing, but no hearing examiner
from the department was present.

(TR. pgs. 19-20)

Appellant was notified of

another

hearing

by oral

notification to his counsel (TR. 20) and a per se hearing was
held before the department October 5, 1983.

(TR. p. 30)

The arresting officer was not present at the hearing,
but the hearing examiner considered his notarized
and

the results of the breathalizer

statement.

(TR. 16)

statement

test contained

in his

In the officer's report he stated that
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the appellant was sitting in the driver's seat, with the keys
in the ignition and in the "on" position, knd that the vehicle
was rolling backward.

(R. 12, DUI Report Form)

Appellant was present at the hearing with counsel.
The hearing examiner summarized his testimony as follows:
Driver testified that he was [sitting in a
vehicle within the impound lot at G & L Motors
of Roosevelt, Utah. He states that the vehicle
was not running and that he was not going to go
anywhere, but was waiting for his wife to come
and pick him up to take him home. He states
that the vehicle was not running, and not
registered. (R.. 12 Facts and Findings)
Prior

to

the

hearing

held

October

5,

appellant

received a Notice from the Department that his drivers license
was suspended for 90 days.
October 3, 1983)

(R. 12, Order| of Suspension dated

Counsel for appellant was informed at the

hearing that said notice of suspension vdas the final notice
appellant would receive from the department:.

(TR. 25)

He timely petitioned the district court for an order
reinstating his driving privileges, whictj petition was filed
October 17, 1983.

(R. 1-5)

A hearing was held before the

Honorable Boyd Bunnell on November 8, 1983, wherein appellant
challenged the constitutionality of §41-^-19.6 U.C.A. on its
face and as applied, and requested that if the court upheld
the statute, it find the decision of tit)tie department to be
arbitrary
Exhibits

or

capricious.

Appellant's

1 and 2, letters evidencing

counsel

proffered

counsel's attempt to

obtain subpoenas at hearings before the department and the
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denial of their request.
(Copies

of

Petition

Exhibits

was

1

denied.

(TR. p. 22, lines 1-9) (TR p.29-30)
and

2

(R.

are

13)

attached
Findings

hereto).

His

of

and

Fact

Conclusions of Law and Order were signed by Judge Bunnell on
November

21,

1983

and

appellant's petition.

filed

November

28,

1983

denying

(R. 21-23)

Appellant's Notice of Appeal was filed December 16,
1983.

(R. 27-28)
He was found not guilty in his criminal trial held

October

31, 1983.

Court and TR. 24)

(Traffic

Docket

from

Roosevelt

Circuit

His driving privileges were reinstated on

October 17, 1983, by the Honorable Richard C. Davidson, judge
of the Seventh Judicial District Court, pending a hearing on
his Petition

(R. 6-7)

and

again

petition, pending this appeal.

after

the denial

of

his

(R. 16-17)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 41-2-19.6 U.C.A. IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS
FACE AND AS APPLIED AS VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES AND ARTICLE I, §7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
UTAH.
Section 41-2-19.6 U.C.A.

(1953 as amended) with an

effective date of August 1, 1983, provides that when a peace
officer has reasonable grounds to believe a person has
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violated §41-6-44 U.C.A. (driving or being in actual physical
control

of

a motor

vehicle

while

under

the

influence

of

alcohol) the officer shall take the Utahfs driverfs license
and issue a temporary license effective fbr thirty days.

If

no

is

action

is taken by

the driver

his or

her

license

automatically suspended for ninety daysf with no provision for
a

restricted

license

to drive

to

and

from work.

If the

arrested person requests a hearing within t;en days of the date
of arrest, a hearing shall be held no later than thirty days
from the date of arrest and issuance of the thirty day license.
The statute further provides that:
(5) The hearing shall be documented and its
scope shall cover the issues of whether a peace
officer had reasonable grounds to believe the
person to have been operating a motor vehicle
in violation of Section 41-6-441 whether the
person refused to submit to the test, and the
test results, if any.
In connection with a
hearing the department . . . may administer
oaths
and
may
issue
subpoenas
for
the
attendance of witnesses and the production of
relevant books and papers.
Section 41-2-20 U.C.A. allows a berson whose license
has been suspended by the department to petition the district
court for a hearing.
review

of

the

The court's jurisdiciion is limited to a

record

to

determine

whether

or

not

the

department's decision was arbitrary or capricious.
The

Utah

legislature

has

attempted

to

set

up

a

procedure whereby a driver is given the opportunity to have a
hearing prior to the time his suspension bepomes final.
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Appellant does not challenge the timing of the administrative
hearing, but challenges the adequacy of the hearing
Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's
caser their continued possession may become
essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.
Suspension of issued licenses thus involves
state
action
that
adjudicates
important
interests of the licensees.
In such cases
licenses are not to be taken away without that
procedural due process required by the 14th
Amendment. (Citations omitted) This is but an
application of the general proposition that
relevant constitutional restraints limit state
power to terminate an entitlement whether the
entitlement is denominated a "right" or a
"privilege". Bell v. Burson, 402 US, at 539,
29 L.Ed2d 90, 91 S.Ct. 1586 (1971)
The United States Supreme Court has dealt with the
issue of timing, and to what extent due process requires a
presuspension hearing.
47

L.Ed2d

18, 96

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 333,

S.Ct.

893

(1976)

applied

a

three

step

analysis which has been followed in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S.
105,

52

L.Ed2d

172, 97

S.Ct.

1723

(1977)

and

Mackey

v.

Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 61 L.Ed2d 321, 99 S.Ct. 2612 (1979) as
being applicable to statutes suspending a driver's license.
In Dixon v. Love, supra, the court upheld a statute
against

constitutional

initial

summary

challenges,

decision

suspending

which

provided

the

motorist's

for

an

license

based on official records that a driver had been convicted of
three moving traffic violations within a twelve month period.
As early as practicable after the suspension, and prior to the
time it became final, a full evidenciary hearing was
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available.

The

case presented

an

issue of

timing

of the

hearing and not adequacy of the hearing.
Also in Mackey v. Montrym, supra, the question raised
was one of timing of the hearing, not adequacy.

The court

upheld a statute which allowed for suspension of a driver's
license, based
driver

had

upon an officer's

refused

to submit

written

report

that

the

to a chemical test, without

providing for a presuspension hearing.

'Jrhe court noted at

page 333 the driver could obtain a prompt hearing to resolve
factual disputes.

The court also noted at page 328 footnote 5

that

could

the

driver

attendance

of

adjourn

witnesses,

the

who

heading

were

then

to permit

the

subject

to

cross-examination.
Although Dixon v. Love, supra andl Mackey v. Montrym,
supra, have allowed suspensions prior to a hearing in certain
circumstances, in both cases, the statutes provided for prompt
and full evidenciary hearings prior to the Ifinal suspension.
The

hearings

held

before

the

department

are

quasi-judicial in that the hearing examiner is empowered to
investigate

facts, weight

evidence,

draw

conclusions, and

exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
In
process

speaking

of

the

necessary

administrative

due

requirements in quasi-judicial hearings, the United

States Supreme Court has held:
All parties must be fully appraised of the
evidence submitted or to be considered and must
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be
given
opportunity
to
cross-examine
witnesses, to inspect documents, and to offer
evidence in explanation or rebuttal.
In no
other way can a party maintain its right or
make its defense* In no other way can it test
the sufficiency of the facts to support the
findings • . . ICC v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co,f 227 U.S. 88 (1913)
Bell v. Burson, supra is most applicable in this case
as

it addressed

the adequacy

of

the

hearing,

rather

than

dealing with the issue of suspension prior to a hearing being
afforded.

The hearing required by the Due Process Clause must

be "meaningful" and "appropriate to the nature of the case."
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized that the
"right to drive is a valuable right or privilege and it cannot
be taken away without procedural due process."

Ballard v.

State Motor Vehicle Division, 595 P.2d 1302 (1979).
In various

state court cases, where

the

issue of

sufficiency of the hearing has been raised, it is generally
held that the driver has the right to cross-examine witnesses
and to confront his accusers at the hearing.

See 60 ALR3d 427

License Revocation - Sufficiency of Hearing §5 and cases cited
therein where courts have held that hearings based solely upon
officers1 written reports, violated the driver's right to be
confronted by his accusers and right to cross examination.
Re Sweeney, 257 A2d 764 (Del. 1969)

In

The statute providing for

a hearing meant a "fair" hearing and suspension was vacated
because officer did not appear at hearing.

In Application of

Goodwin, 173 Misc 169, 17 NYS2d 426 (1940), substantial rights
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of

the motorist

were violated

where

th^ affidavit of the

police officer was received and the driver had no chance to be
confronted by his accuser.
Therefore,

the

United

Supreme Court and courts from

States

Supreme

numerous other

Court, Utah
jurisdictions

have all held that due process requires a "meaningful" hearing
and

this

in

turn

requires

that

a person

be

allowed

the

opportunity to confront his accusers, to cross-examine them,
and to be empowered to subpoena other witne sses on his behalf.
Appellant's

license

soley upon the notarized
present.

was

revoked

by

the

department

report of an o fficer who was not

The right to cross-examination is vital to insure

that procedural requirements set forth in ^tatute and case law
are complied with, in additional to ascertaining the truth.
Two examples come to mind:

The Utah statute requires that the

hearing be conducted upon the "sworn" repprt of the officer.
§41-2-19.6(4)

U.

C.

A.

Appellant

had

no

opportunity

to

question the officer as to whether or not he did in fact make
an affirmative act of swearing at the timd in compliance with
the recent case of Colman v. Schwendimaij, No. 18652 (Filed
Feb. 29, 1984

Utah).

There was no evidence he was qualified

to operate the breathalizer machine, or tnat he complied with
the other standards set forth in State vj
846, 355 P.2d 806, 809 (1960).
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Baker, 56 Wash.2d

Although

the

state

should

have

the

burden

of

producing the officer, even if a driver wanted to subpoena the
officer, or any other witness on his behalf, department policy
has been
request

to deny

drivers any

subpoenas

unless

they

first

the subpoenas in writing and state the anticipated

testimony.

(Proffered

Exhibits

1 and

2)

Given

the

time

limitations in these hearings, which is often less than five
daysf it is impossible for drivers to request the subpoenas in
writing and obtain them prior to the hearings and get them
served.
The

statute only

requires

that the examiner

"may"

issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses, not that he
"must"

issue

them

at the driver's

request.

In Beatty

v.

Hults, 22 App.Div.2d 740, 253 NYS2d 327 (NY 1964) the driver's
license suspension was reversed for failure of the examiner to
issue requested subpoenas.
Also, the statute does not provide what prior notice
of the hearing, if any, must be given the motorists.

In this

case notice of a hearing to be held September 28 was dated and
mailed

September

23.

September

23,

1983,

was

a

Friday.

Allowing three working days for mail delivery this would be
one day prior notice of the hearing.

Although not binding on

administration agencies, Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure

require

five

days

prior

notice

of

hearings

motions, excluding weekends and holidays, and allowing for
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on

three days for service by mail.

It is questionable whether

one day prior notice in appellant's case is adequate under the
due process requirements.

The statute on its face is silent

as to what prior notice is sufficient and cpould - be interpreted
to

allow

for

even

one

hours

notice.

Due

process

is an

opportunity to be heard and "it is an opportunity which must
be granted to a meaningful time and in a Meaningful manner."
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 14 L.Ed2d 62, 85 S.Ct.
1187 (1965)
The statute is unconstitutional on its face in that
the hearing is conducted solely upon the J sworn report of an
absent officers; it does not mandate that the hearing examiner
provide the motorists with subpoenas; and it is silent as to
what prior notice be given the motorist ol f the hearing date.
For the same reasons, it is unconstitutional as applied in
this case

in that the officer did not kppear; counsel for

appellant had previously been denied
requesting

them

in writing

subpoenas unless first

and given

the

time

limitations

(notice mailed on the 23rd for hearing to be held on the 28th)
an attempt to request subpoenas would have peen futile.
POINT II
THE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION WAS ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS.
The

department's

decision

was

based

totally

on

hearsay evidence, inasmuch as the officer did not appear at
the hearing, but submitted his sworn report which contained
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the results of the breathalizer test and several statements as
to why he believed appellant was in actual physical control of
a motor vehicle.
The

department

has

determined

that

"The

hearing

officer shall not be bound by formal rules of evidence or
procedure in administration of this hearing but shall consider
all relevant evidence.w

(R.l - Opening Statement of Hearing

Examiner)
Although

hearsay

evidence

is

generally

admissible

within the State of Utah, in administrative proceedings, it is
well

established

that

the

administrative

hearing

officer

cannot base his findings wholly upon hearsay evidence.
In workman's compensation cases before the Industrial
Commission, it has been determined that there must be at least
a residuum of evidence to support the administrative hearing
that would

be competent

in

a court

of

law.

Hackford

v.

Industrial Commmission, 11 Utah 2d 312, 358 P. 2d 899 (Utah
1961).
This principal

is

likewise

applicable

in

hearings

before the bank commissioner.
[T]his court has held that hearsay evidence is
admissible before the Industrial Commission and
the Public Service Commission.
However, a
finding of fact cannot be based solely upon
hearsay evidence, but must be "supported by a
residuum of legally competent evidence in a
court of law." No sound reason appears why the
same
rule
should
not
be
applicable
to
proceedings
before
the
bank
commissioner.
Sandy Bank v. Brimhal, 636 Pl2d 481 (Utah 1981)
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The "legal residuum rule" is firmly established in
Utah and widely recognized in jurisdictions throughout this
country and in general works of law.
Note

-

Hearsay

Evidence

in

Administrative

Agencies, 1971.

Administrative

Law, Section

See 36 ALR3d 12, Comment

Proceed!]ings
Also

691.

Before

se^ 2 AmJur2d

That

rule

State
577-581

requires

some

residuum of evidence admissible in a court of law.
Clearly

the

breathalizer

test

results

are

not

admissible unless certain foundational requirements are met,
none of which were present at appellant's hearing.

Murray

City v. Hall, No. 17329, (Filed April ]L3, 1983, Utah) and
State v. Baker, supra.
Police reports containing matter^ observed by police
officers are not admissible at a defendant's criminal trial.
Rule 803 (8) (B) Utah Rules of Evidence. ptate v. Bertul, 644
P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983)
There was no "legal residuum" of evidence to support
the administrative

finding

that the officer

had

reasonable

grounds to believe appellant to have beeih in actual physical
control of a vehicle and had a blood alcphol content of .08%
or

greater.

Therefore

the

decision

was

arbitrary

or

capricious.
In Young v. Board of Pharmacy, 462 P. 2d 139 (N.Mex.
1969) it was held that an administrative finding based solely
on hearsay does not rise to the level of substantial evidence
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and hence, is an arbitrary and capricious action.
Appellant

was

not

afforded

a

"meaningful" hearing

that complied with due process (Point I ) f nor was any evidence
legally competent in a court of law offered against him, and
therefore

the

department's

decision

was

arbitrary

or

capricious.
POINT III
ACQUITTAL BY THE COURT OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES BARS
SUSPENSION OF APPELLANT'S LICENSE.
As a general rule, acquittal on a criminal charge is
not a bar to subsequent civil action arising out of the same
facts on which the criminal proceeding

was held.

Criminal

charges require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas proof
in civil actions and administrative hearings is of a lesser
degree.

See 96 ALR2d

§612 which dealt with various state

court decision.
However, Mackey v. Montrym, supra, at 328 seems to
support the proposition that a finding by a court is binding
on the administrative

agency.

Montyrm

received

notice his

license was suspended for failure to take a breath-analysis
test.

Rather than obtaining an immediate hearing before the

Registrar, he took an appeal to the Board of Appeal.
the

time

the

Board

of

Appeal

was

to

conduct

Prior to

a hearing,

Montrym1s counsel made demand upon the Registrar for return of
his license, and stated in the letter that he had been
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acquitted

of

the

driving

under

the

influence

charge, and

asserted that the state court's finding that the officer had
refused to administer the test was binding on the Registrar.
The court sated:
Had Montrym's counsel enclosed d copy of the
order dismissing the drunk-driving charge, the
entire matter might well have be^n disposed of
at that state without more.
In

analyzing

the

issue

of

presuspension hearing, the court

tlfie

i

reasoned

necessity

of

a

at page 332 the

issue reaised by Montrym was not a "factual11 one but rather a
legal

question;

that

is

whether

the

court's

subsequent

finding that the police later refused to administer the test
was

binding

on

the

Registrar

as

a

njatter

of

collateral

estoppel.
The

issue of collateral

estoppel was not directly

dealt with in Montrym, as the issue was {not raised on appeal,
but

in the court's analysis of the case
I

it intimated had

•

counsel properly submitted the order dismissing the criminal
charge to the Registrar, the matter may have been disposed of.
In appellant's case prior to hearing on his petition
before the district court he was acquitted of the criminal
charges.

However, the trial judge refusjed to find it a bar to

his suspension.
The

factual

issues

were

exactly

the

same

in the

j
department's hearing and in the district court,
specific intent was involved in the criminal case.
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and

no

The acquittal
hazard and

therefore

indicates appellant
the purpose of

is not a safety

§41-2-19.5 U.C.A.

for

suspension of licenses has not been fully complied with.
CONCLUSION
A

hearing

based

upon

the

notarized

officer is not a "meaningful11 hearing
their

constitutional

cross-examine them.

rights

report

of

an

and denies motorists

to confront

their

accusers and

The department's policy of not allowing a

driver's access to subpoenas is also a flagrant violation of
constitutional rights.
The

hearsay

report

of

the

officer

and

improperly

considered breathalizer result do not comply with the 'legal
residuum'

rule

followed

in

Utah,

and

standing

alone

or

consided with the constitutional violations, make the decision
of the department arbitrary or capricious.
The court's acquittal of the crimial charges should
be binding on the department.
Motorists often depend on the ability to drive for
their livelihood and this property right is constitutionally
directed.

The

enactment

of

§41-2-19.6 U.C.A. manifests an

intent by the Legislature to relieve the State of Utah of the
inconvenience of calling the officer at every hearing before
the

department.

However,

constitutional protections.

expediency

must

be

limited

by

The most expedient hearing would

be no hearing at all.

-16-

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th diy of August, 1984.
McRAE & D^LAND
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Attorney for Appellant
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Bruce

M.
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Assistant

Attorney

Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah

General,

84114 on| this
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State

17th day of

August, 1984.
^
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Mr
McRAE 8 D E L A N D
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW

ROBERT M. MCRAE
LONI F! DELAND
J O A N N B. STRINGHAM
L. A. DEVER
72 EAST FOURTH SOUTH. SUITE 3 5 5
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE leOl) 36A-I333

HALLS CROSSING. UTAH
TELEPHONE (6011 7 8 B - 2 H 5 EXTENSION Hl|

A S H T O N ENERGY CENTER
t e S O WEST HIGHWAY A O . SUITE I I S O
VERNAL. UTAH 8 4 0 7 8
TELEPHONE (SOU 7 8 9 - 1 6 6 6

July 15, 1983

Mr. Phil Himmelberger
Driver License Services
Third Floor South
2501 South 2700 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84119
Dear Phil:
Several weeks ago I asked you to forward to me a
supply of blank issued driver's license d epprtment subpoenas
as contemplated by your statutory authority to issue subpoenas,
Please do so immediately.
I also request again at this time a copy of the
department rules and regulations pertaining to driver's license
matters including, but not limited to, postj-arrest hearings
and refusal hearings which will be held under House Bill #142,
which I believe is the correct designation pf the new DUI law
which takes effect August 1, 1983.
Sincerely,

Robert M. McRae
RMMrpm

-

CtefcM Court

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF U T A H

DAVID L.WILKINSC
ATTORNEY GENEF

PAULM.TINKI
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENEP

RICHARD L. DEWSN
Solicitor Gem

July 22, 1983

FRANKLYN B. MATHESON.CI
Governmental Affairs Divis
ROBERT R. WALLACE, CI
Litigation Divis
WILLIAM T. EVANS. Q
Human Resources Divis

ROBERT M. MCRAE
McRae & DeLand
72 East Fourth South, Suite 355
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
RE:

DONALD S COLEMAN, CI
Physical Resources Divis
MARK K. BUCH1.C1
Tax & Business Regulation Divis

Administrative Subpoenas

Dear Bob:
Your telephone conversation and letter to Phil
Himmelberger regarding the above have been referred to
me for response. Please be advised that under my advice,
it is departmental policy to issue subpoenas only in cases
where good cause that is relevant is given to the central
office in writing. If you will provide the same in a
specific case, the Department will grant your request.
The Department rules and regulations have not been
implemented yet because they have not had experience with
the matter. That will be done pursuant to the proper statutory
authority and as soon as it is done we will| send you one of
the first copies.
Sincerely,

BRUCE M. HALEl
Assistant Attorney General
Tax and Business Regulation Div,
BMH/vlw
cc;

STATE

P h i l Himmelberger

CAPITOL

/ SALT

LAKE

CITY,UTAH

8 4 1 1 4J / T E L E P H O N E

(801)

533-52

